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Home Firm Performance after
Foreign Investments and Divestitures
Abstract
‘Being international’ has nearly become an undisputed aim for ﬁ  rms in a globalized 
world. Several papers ﬁ  nd a positive relationship between foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and the home performance of ﬁ  rms. In this paper we address the “FDI – export” 
relationship to better understand this pattern. Furthermore, by presenting ﬁ  rst results 
on ﬁ  rm’s post-divestiture employment growth at home we are able to provide a more 
comprehensive view on ﬁ  rm performance after stepping in and out of foreign markets. 
We apply a propensity score matching technique in combination with a diﬀ  erence-
in-diﬀ  erence estimator to analyze the performance dynamics of French ﬁ  rms that 
invested abroad or carried out foreign divestitures during the period 2000-2007. FDI 
has on average a positive home ﬁ  rm eﬀ  ect in terms of export share, operating turn-
over and employment. Industry diﬀ  erences reveal that ﬁ  rms in high-tech industries 
experience a strong increase in their home performance, whereas ﬁ  rm performance 
in low-tech industries increases only moderately in post-investment periods. In con-
trast, the divestiture impact on the post-divestiture performance is rather negligible..
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1.  Introduction 
Policymakers worry that foreign direct investments (FDI) imply a significant relocation of 
jobs from home to host countries. From a theoretical point of view, switching from export to 
FDI might substitute export activity to some extent. A negative effect is often expected for 
factor-seeking FDI where firms decide to relocate some production processes to exploit cost 
advantages at foreign affiliates’ locations. However, existing papers do not provide a 
substantial empirical confirmation for negative effects of FDI on home employment, e.g. 
Barba Navaretti and Castellani 2008, Becker and Muendler 2008, Desai et al. 2009. 
Therefore, this paper investigates the extent to which the FDI – export relationship can help to 
explain this pattern. Based on a large database for French firms and applying propensity score 
matching combined with a difference-in-difference estimator it can be shown that FDI and 
exporting constitute rather complements than substitutes. To the authors knowledge there is 
no study which analyzes the FDI and export relationship as well as the relationship between 
FDI and home plant employment.  
Head and Ries (2004) argue that vertical specialization of firms and home centralization of 
certain (e.g. knowledge-intensive) products may matter for firms which in turn would point 
towards a positive association between FDI and exporting. By differentiating between firms in 
high-tech and low-tech industries we further attempt to provide some empirical evidence. The 
imitation of knowledge-intensive products might have great consequences for the comparative 
advantage of firms in high-tech industries, so that the latter might be more inclined to opt for 
home centralization of production processes than firms in low-tech industries. As a result, 
export activity of firms in high-tech industries might be more affected by the FDI decision.  
While many empirical studies analyze the role of investments and acquisitions on home plant 
performance, we fail to detect any study which addresses the effects of divesting from abroad 
on home firm employment, turnover and export activity. The recently published meta-analysis 
of Lee and Madhavan (2010) clearly confirms this research gap. Existing papers focus either 
on stock price changes due to foreign divestitures announcements or financial accounting 
measures (e.g. return on investment). Driven by the globalization of production processes, 
divestitures have become of increasing relevance in the last decades. Moreover, business 
restructuring due to the financial and economic crisis in 2008 will further raise the likelihood 
of divestitures in the years to come.  
Additionally, investments of an acquirer often go hand in hand with divestments of a seller. 
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) analyzed a sample of large acquisitions between 1971 and 1982 5 
 
and detect that 44% of targets are divested by the acquirer by the end of 1989. By analyzing 
both, the effects of investing abroad and divesting from abroad, we finally provide a 
comprehensive view on the home performance of firms after stepping in and out of foreign 
markets. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a brief review of the 
FDI and divestiture literature with respect to firm performance. Section 3 describes the 
methodological approach. A data description is provided in Section 4. Section 5 presents and 
discusses the estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Background 
2.1   Effects of investing abroad  
The debate of home market effects from FDI is often linked to the actual type of FDI, namely 
horizontal and vertical FDI. Resource-seeking (vertical) FDI might affect home plant output 
and employment negatively and productivity positively in the short-term as some production 
processes are relocated to exploit cost advantages at the foreign location. In the long-term, 
however, positive backward effects on output and employment based on reducing the cost of 
production may dominate which then allows to decrease product prices and thus, could induce 
higher demand at home.  
Market-driven (horizontal) FDI might not affect home employment if there is no other 
efficient opportunity to serve foreign markets otherwise. Moreover, extensive intra-firm trade 
between the headquarters and their foreign affiliates can even increase the number of 
employees at home. However, horizontal FDI might equally well substitute some export 
activities and therefore, employment at home declines. Moreover, multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) with horizontal FDI are likely to exploit economies of scale by accessing new 
markets which in turn may have positive effects on the productivity at home. Similarly, firms 
experience performance gains through their exposure in foreign markets (see e.g. the 
learning-by-exporting hypothesis postulated by Wagner 2007). In sum, it is not only difficult 
to predict home plant effects, it is also difficult to differentiate between horizontal and vertical 
FDI as FDI decisions often follow complex integration strategies with investments being 
interdependent and benefiting from complementarities across locations (Yeaple 2003).  
Recent empirical studies analyses intensively the effects of investing abroad on home plant’s 
performance. The initial paper of Egger and Paffermayr (2003) marks the starting point for 
empirically studying the effects of investing abroad at home on the micro level of firms. 6 
 
Based on the extensive use of propensity score matching combined with a difference-in-
differences (DiD) approach in the microeconometric program evaluation, this kind of 
estimator has also received increasing attention in the FDI literature.  
Barba Navaretti and Castellani (2008) apply this estimator and find significant positive effects 
of outward FDI by Italian MNEs on turnover and productivity (TFP) at home but the effect on 
employment is insignificant. Based on a small sample of 47 German MNEs, Kleinert and 
Toubal (2007) also observe an insignificant effect on employment and a significant increase 
in TFP in the first year after investing abroad. Jäckle and Wamser (2010) use the same 
database and apply Heckman’s (1978) parametric estimator for endogenous treatment effects. 
They find significant positive effects of FDI on TFP for German MNEs up to three years after 
going abroad.
1 For Japanese MNEs, Hijzen et al. (2007) observe a weak significant positive 
effect on home plant TFP in the initial year and significant positive effects on output and 
employment in the following three years. The study of Becker and Muendler (2008) combines 
German plant level data with data about foreign affiliates to estimate the effect of 
employment expansion in foreign affiliates on domestic employment. The authors detect that 
the probability of domestic worker separation is significantly reduced. In fact, the fear of 
policy makers that outward FDI relocates jobs from home to target countries is hardly 
supported in corresponding empirical studies.  
A handful of papers consider host country characteristics to estimate the effects of investing 
abroad for horizontal and vertical FDI. Head and Ries (2004) look at the host countries 
chosen by firms for their investments and classify them into low- and high-wage countries. 
The authors argue that firms with investment in low-wage countries only follow vertical FDI 
motives, whereas companies with investments in a wider range of low- and high-wage 
countries follow a more horizontal pattern of FDI. Barba Navaretti et al. (2010) adopt the 
basic idea to analyse the impact on TFP, turnover and employment at home for Italian and 
French MNEs. Interestingly, the findings do not differ remarkably for outward investments in 
low-wage and high-wage countries. TFP growth is significantly positive in Italy, whereas FDI 
of French firms does not matter for TFP growth at home. Employment is neither significantly 
negative in France nor in Italy. Similarly, Becker and Muendler (2008) do not detect any 
remarkable differences across several host country locations. In sum, there is hardly any 
evidence of a negative effect of outward investments on home performance, in particular on 
home employment.  
                                                 
1 Interestingly the OLS estimates are downward biased in this study which suggests that no significant 
differences in TFP growth and employment growth exist. 7 
 
Given that MNEs pursue horizontal and vertical FDI simultaneously in the same host 
countries (Feinberg and Keane 2006), the lack of notable differences in the effects across low-
wage and high-wage countries might not be surprising. In a recent study Hering et al. (2009) 
consider affiliates characteristics to better distinguish between horizontal and vertical FDI for 
Japanese MNEs. Affiliates with a high level of local purchases and high sales back to Japan 
are defined as vertical FDI. In line with theoretical predictions of the ‘proximity-concentration 
trade-off’ the authors observe that horizontal FDI substitutes exports from MNEs’ home in 
Japan. In contrast, imports increase for MNEs with vertical FDI. The study further points out 
that labour productivity in Japanese parent companies increases either when Japanese MNEs 
start horizontal FDI in high-income countries or vertical FDI in low-income countries.  
Many other papers explicitly address the relationship between FDI and export. Head and Ries 
(2004) summarize most of this literature and argue that complementarity between FDI and 
export occurs when investing abroad is linked with (i) vertical specialization (exports of 
intermediate goods between the parent company and its foreign affiliates) and/or (ii) home 
centralization of one product and foreign centralization of another product. Here, home 
centralization for firms becoming engaged in FDI implies, that they simultaneously increase 
the domestic production for products destined for export markets.  
A comprehensive study, however, which analyses the “FDI – export” and the “FDI – home 
performance” relationship simultaneously is still missing. Analyzing export activities, 
employment, turnover and productivity in the post-change period also offers useful insight for 
the general understanding of changes in production processes.  
We further expect that the complementarity between FDI and export differs with respect to 
firm’s strategy of home centralization based on their technological advantage. In general, 
products of firms in high-tech industries are based on remarkable achievements in R&D in 
order to create a sustainable technological advantage. Faced by the risk of product imitation 
firms may opt for home centralization of high-tech products and vertical specialization in 
order to reduce this risk. Therefore, one might assume that firms in high-tech industries are 
more inclined to opt for home centralization and vertical specialization than firms in low-tech 
industries. As a result, export activity of firms in high-tech industries might then be more 
affected by foreign market entry and exit via FDI than typical low-tech firms. Recent 
empirical findings of Stiebale (2010) strengthen this prediction. Applying an empirical 
framework which accounts for unobserved firm heterogeneity and the possible endogeneity of 
cross-border acquisitions, he shows that R&D activity of acquirers in high-tech industries was 
intensified after an outward merger or acquisition compared to acquirers in low-tech 8 
 
industries. Thus, the concentration of R&D at home might be driven by realizing economies 
of scale as well as by the fact that knowledge spillover to competitors should be minimized. 
 
2.2   Effects of divesting from abroad  
While the literature intensively discusses the effects of investing abroad, there are not many 
studies in the Economics literature which analyse the effects of foreign divestitures on the 
home performance of enterprises. Foreign divestitures are characterized by a shut down or 
asset sale of foreign operations (e.g. Benito 1997). Following Hanson and Song (2003) and 
Mathur et al. (2006) four main reasons for divesting can be detected: (i) Eliminating negative 
synergies, (ii) raising cash to fund other investments, (iii) agency problems, and (iv) a positive 
difference between acquirer’s willingness to pay for the asset and its valuation by the seller. 
With respect to foreign operations, negative synergies mainly arise when a foreign subsidiary 
underperforms and resources have to be shifted from the mother company to the foreign 
subsidiary. Agency problems are mainly driven by managerial discretion. Insufficient 
monitoring mechanism as well as managerial incentive schemes to promote growth instead of 
profitability of firms imply that manager tend to waste free cash flow for less profitable 
projects to realize their own non-value maximizing objectives (Jensen 1986).  
The empirical literature on the effects of divestitures either focus on accounting measures like 
return on assets (ROA) or market-based measures like cumulative abnormal returns (see Lee 
and Madhavan 2010 for details). With respect to the latter stock price changes prior and after 
the announcement of divestiture are analysed (see e.g., Cao et al. 2008 for a recent study). 
Given that divestitures reduce negative synergies as well as agency costs, the mother 
company has the potential to increase its cash position. Hanson and Song (2003) empirically 
confirm this prediction. Divesting firms have significant lower returns on asset than matched 
control firms in the two years before divestiture, but significant higher returns in the second 
and third year after divestiture. Denis and Shome (2005) analysed 130 large asset downsizings 
between 1985-1994 and detect that downsized firms achieve on average an 7.9% increase in 
the mean of operating income divided by book value of assets within three years after 
downsizing.  
The effects on employment and productivity might differ from effects on accounting 
measures. First, foreign divestitures can offer growth opportunities at headquarters when 
production is shifted back home and foreign markets of previously divested foreign affiliates 
are partly served from home. Based on 664 foreign divestiture announcements, Mathur et al. 9 
 
(2006) did not find an significant reduction in foreign sales related to total sales between two 
years after and one year before announcements for firms with foreign divestitures in 
comparison to control firms without foreign divestitures. This finding supports the view that 
these firms did not exit foreign markets completely.  
Positive employment effects may also occur due to reduced negative synergies, debt overhang 
and agency problems. Mathur et al. (2006) detected that capital expenditures divided by total 
assets are slightly higher for firms with foreign divestitures than for control firms. Thus, home 
enterprise’ employment might gain from foreign divestitures. However, if markets previously 
served by divested foreign affiliates are not direct served from production plants at home, e.g. 
due to a complete market exit or serving markets from other foreign affiliates, companies’ 
employment in the home country might not be affected. Thus an empirical analysis can 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of average employment effects after foreign 
divestitures.  
 
3.  Methodology: Evaluation problem and matching procedure 
In this section we briefly describe the methodological approach of a difference-in-difference 
(DiD) estimator which is applied in this paper. An example would be an exporter who 
becomes engaged in FDI. The goal is to identify the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT), i.e. the average effect of this upward change of internationalization on companies 
which start undertaking FDI (treatment).  
The ATT for all treatments then is given as follows: 
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where  	

  denote firm i’s outcome in a subsequent year k after firm i has changed its mode 
of internationalization from an exporter to become a MNE in year t (DIi,t=1), 	
 contains a 
set of firm characteristics and  	

  denotes the outcome of firm i if it had not invested 





   is unobservable, and this so-
called counterfactual outcome is noted with C.  
The counterfactual outcome poses the main evaluation problem. One needs an adequate 
estimator for the counterfactual outcome of a treatment. A simplistic approach would be to 10 
 
take the outcome of a continuous exporter (non-treatment). This approach would only be 
valid if there is a random selection into the group of switchers. However, this is unlikely to be 
the case here. Therefore, the potential selection bias must be accounted for in order to arrive 
at valid estimates of the internationalization impact. A number of non-experimental 
techniques (e.g. instrumental variable (IV) approach, matching) exist to deal with the 
selection issue (see e.g. Heckman et al. 1998, 1999, Schmidt 2007). In this paper we will 
combine the propensity score matching to construct the sample of adequate counterfactual 
firms with the difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator to estimate the ATT (e.g. Blundell and 
Costa Dias 2000, 2002).  
The method of matching follows the idea of selection on observables: For every firm in the 
treatment group a matching firm from the non-treatment group needs to be found with very 
similar characteristics on the observables. However, for the matching to be valid, certain 
requirements have to be met. A fundamental identifying assumption is the conditional 
independence assumption (CIA). CIA states that conditional on matrix 	
, the observables 
in the period before investing abroad, the outcome of those who do not switch is independent 
of the actual treatment status. This implies that the outcome  	

  of a non-treatment is an 
adequate estimator for the counterfactual outcome   	

  of a treatment provided that no 
systematic differences in the matrix 	












The CIA then implies that any difference in unobservables is trivial and that they do not affect 
outcomes in the absence of treatment (see Heckman et al. 1998). Keeping in mind that the 
CIA is an untestable assumption, not only a rich dataset is needed for the CIA to hold, one 
also needs to be confident that the determinants of the outcome variable and the major 
determinants to explain the change of the mode of internationalization are observed.  
As the number of observables used in the matching increases it becomes rather difficult to 
find a suitable match for every firm and every unmatched firm results in a loss of this 
observation. The propensity score method suggested by the pioneer work of Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) constitutes a helpful solution by computing	
, the probability of 
investing abroad conditional on observables 	
 by applying a logit or probit estimation. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrate that it is sufficient to use this single index   
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propensity score to obtain consistent estimates for the counterfactual situation instead of   
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The precondition is that the propensity score of matched non-treated companies to become 
MNEs is very close to the propensity score of treated firms. The effective implementation of 
propensity score matching needs to fulfil the common support assumption, i.e. the exclusion 
of non-treated companies that are poorly matched with respect to the propensity score. One 
has to bear in mind that the estimated treatment effect only measures the ATT of those falling 
within the common support. We apply propensity score matching with replacement to 
improve the fit of matches. This procedure implies that a non-treated firm can be matched to 
more than one treated firm. Therefore, a correction for standard errors to draw conclusion on 
statistical inference is required. We follow Lechner (2001) and apply his estimator for an 
asymptotic approximation of the standard errors.  
Several matching methods are at the hands of the researcher (e.g. Blundell and Costa Dias 
2002). In this study we report the results of the nearest neighbour matching
2 and check for the 
robustness of the results with the Mahalanobis distance (MD) matching. The nearest 
neighbour method matches each treated firm with a one non-treated firm with the closest 
propensity score. The MD method is a propensity score based matching technique which 
allows to put additional weight on selected covariates (here the industries). While treated and 
non-treated firms are very similar to industry, this is especially useful to control for industry 
specific business cycle shocks. The matching method in hand, we then apply difference-in-
difference estimator to calculate the ATT as follows: 
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  for matched 
non-treated firms eliminates potential effects of time-invariant unobservables on the outcome 
variable. It remains a bias only from two sources: First, time-variant unobservable firm 
characteristics may differ between treated and matched non-treated firms (e.g., organisational 
innovations, entry and exit of experts and management) and both groups response 
differentially to changes in markets and macroeconomic conditions.  
                                                 
2 The matching procedure is carried out using software package psmatch2 in STATA 11 (see Leuven and Sianesi 
2003). 12 
 
4.  Data 
4.1   Panel structure 
In the paper at hand the firm-level data are taken from the European AMADEUS database 
which is provided by Bureau van Dijk. Whereas companies’ financial records are available 
for up to 10 years, information on their ownership and subsidiary structure is limited to the 
year of data compilation. In this chapter, we focus on changes in the international status of 
companies between the years 2000 and 2002, 2002 and 2004, as well as 2005 and 2007, 
respectively. Consequently, we analyse the post-entry and post-exit home performance of 
French exporters and MNEs that change their status in 2001, 2003 or 2006.  
Our dataset is limited to unconsolidated firm-level accounts in order to analyse location and 
entity specific performance effects. The data set includes companies of a wide range of 
manufacturing and service industries.
3 Table 1 provides an overview of the underlying panel 
structure. The overall panel is unbalanced as the latest year for which key financial data are 
available is 2007. Given the underlying data structure, the short-term analysis in t+1 is based 
on a larger sample of firms than the long-term analysis for t+5 and t+6. The latter is restricted 
to firms that changed their internationalization status in 2001.  
We differentiate between two types of changers with exporting firms that become engaged in 
FDI (i.e. new MNEs, DX-DI) and MNEs that divest all foreign affiliates to become pure 
exporters (DI-DX). The number of observations, as depicted in Table 2, are obtained from 
probit estimations with variables taken from the pre-change periods. In sum, the number of 
exporters going abroad is much larger (884) than the number of MNEs that cease their foreign 
operations (279). In the majority of cases a large pool of potential control firms (non-
changers) exists which is a pre-requisite for finding a comparable firm for each treated 
observation in the subsequent matching procedure.  
The number of firms used in the matching procedure and difference-in-difference analysis can 
be further reduced if key performance variables are missing in the post-change period. 
Consequently, the number of observations depends on the type of change, the year of change  
 
 
                                                 
3 Excluded from the analysis are the following industries (with the industry codes (NACE) in parentheses): 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry (01, 02), fishing (05), mining and quarrying (10-14), management activities of 
holding companies (7415), public administration and defense, compulsory social security (75) and activities of 
membership organizations (91). Moreover, the dataset is purged from outliers for key financial indicators. 13 
 
Table 1: Panel structure 
Pre-change Change  Post-change 
         
t-2 t-1  t  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 
          
1999 2000 2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
2001 2002 2003  2004 2005 2006 2007  -  - 
2004 2005 2006  2007  - - - - - 
 
Table 2: Number of observations  
 
 
and the specific outcome variable.
4 Therefore, the final sample size is reported with the results 
for the difference-in-difference analysis in Tables 6 to 9 in Section 5.2. 
 
4.2   Outcome and Control Variables 
All firm-specific state variables used in the probit model to explain the internationalization 
behaviour are taken from the pre-change period, t-1. The export activity, our main indicator of 
                                                 
4 In principle there are 36 different sample sizes due to 2 changing modes (DX-DI and DI-DX), 3 changing years 
(2001, 2003 and 2006) and 6 outcome variables (export turnover, export share, number of employees, operating 
turnover, labour productivity and TFP). 
 
2000 2002 2005 Total
DX-DI Treated 539 155 190 884
DX-DX Control 5,025 4,908 4,976 14,909
DI-DX Treated 73 135 71 279
DI-DI Control 60 475 526 1,061
Notes: Changes in the internationalization status can occur between 2000 and 2002, 2002 and
2004, 2005 and 2007, where the first year refers to the pre-change period (t-1). For example,
firms in the DX-DI group with the pre-change year 2000 were exporters (DX) in 2000 who
became MNEs (DI) by 2004. The number of observations is obtained from probit models on
pre-change variables. The control groups refer to the potential number of firms that can




Pre-change year (t-1)14 
 
interest, is measured in absolute terms as export turnover and in relative terms as export share 
(export to total operating revenue).  
Many theoretical and empirical papers (e.g. Roberts and Tybout 1997, Bernard and Jensen 
2004, Helpman et al. 2004) emphasize the important role of basic firm characteristics like the 
number of employees, operating revenue, age and productivity for bearing the sunk costs of 
foreign market entry. Operating revenue is included as state variable and growth rate to 
account for companies’ state dependence and growth path. The productivity measures used in 
this paper refer either to labour productivity, defined as operating revenue per employee, or 
total factor productivity (TFP). The latter is obtained by following the procedure of Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003) which yields consistent estimates of firm-level TFP.
5  
Recently published studies point out that multi-unit and multinational characteristics as well 
as ownership characteristics can also affect firm’s mode of internationalization (e.g. Roper et 
al. 2006, Bernard and Jensen 2007, Greenaway et al. 2007). Therefore, firms’ ownership 
structure is used as a proxy for the underlying strategic interests of its owners and is captured 
by the dummy variables corporate shareholder,  financial shareholder,  state shareholder, 
individual shareholder and foreign shareholder for non-French investors. Only owners with 
an ownership share of 10% or more are taken into account in order to assure an effective 
voice in the management of a firm. The organizational structure is further accounted for by 
the number of domestic subsidiaries.  
Financially constrained firms might be less likely to enter (Chaney 2005) and more likely to 
leave foreign markets. Companies can fail to finance their internationalization because of a 
liquidity shortage. Thus, following recent empirical papers on foreign market participation 
(Greenaway et al. 2007, Stiebale 2010), we include a liquidity ratio defined as the difference 
of current assets and current liabilities to total assets.  
Markusen (1995) points out the positive correlation between the importance of intangible 
assets in industries and the economic importance of MNEs. The ratio of intangible fixed 
assets to tangible fixed assets is used as a proxy for the knowledge capital because no direct 
information is available on corporate R&D expenses. Finally, up to 28 industry dummies 
based on the two-digit NACE classification attempt to capture remaining industry-specific 
heterogeneity.  
                                                 
5 Levinsohn, Petrin and Poi (2003) provide a STATA command (levpet) to implement their TFP estimations. The 
TFP value corresponds to the residual obtained from a firm-specific logarithmised Cobb-Douglas production 
function. In contrast to labour productivity, TFP has no obvious scaling or natural base values thereby impeding 
a direct interpretation.  
 15 
 
For evaluating the post-entry as well as post-exit performance we concentrate on six outcome 
variables. The main variables of interest are export share and export turnover in order to 
analyse the extent to which exports serve as substitutes or complements of FDI. Additionally, 
employment, operating revenue, labour productivity and total factor productivity are taken 
into account. With exception of the export share we compute and compare growth rates of 
variables between the treatment and non-treatment group. The computation of the growth rate 
follows Evan’s (1987) approach by assuming an exponential growth trend.
6 Annual average 
growth rates are calculated as difference between the logarithm of outcome variables in any 
year t+k (with k   1) and the pre-switching year t-1 divided by the number of years between 
t+k and t-1. 
 
5.  Results 
5.1   Propensity Score Matching 
In a first step of the matching procedure, we acquire the propensity score for each firm by 
estimating the probability of changing the international status in a probit model. We run 
separate probit estimations for each switching mode and year. Table 3 provides an overview 
of the probit estimations for the year 2002.
7 Exporters exhibiting a high operating turnover are 
more likely to become engaged in FDI while it has not significant effect on the likelihood of 
exiting foreign markets. Firms with a higher export share are more likely to set up foreign 
operations whereas absolute export turnover exhibits a negative effect. However, leaving 
operating turnover out of the estimation yields a positive and highly significant coefficient for 
export turnover.
8  
The ownership structure constitutes an important indicator for changes in the 
internationalization status. Corporate and financial shareholders increase the probability for 
exporters to invest abroad and financial investors increase the likelihood of a downward 
change for MNEs. Labour productivity decreases the likelihood of exporters to become 
MNEs. Using, however, a more parsimonious specification reveals that productivity 
significantly increases the likelihood to change upwards while it has no effect on changing 
downwards.  
                                                 
6 Alternatively, a constant growth trend can be assumed. However, for analyzing average employment growth 
based on N-firms with consideration of positive and negative growth rates, the error is lower if an exponential 
growth trend is assumed.  
7 The probit estimations for 2000 and 2005 yield similar results and are available on request.  
8 The correlation between operating turnover (in logs) and export turnover is 0.29. 16 
 
Table 3: Probit estimations for all internationalization changes in 2002 
  
 
Base group    DX-DX DI-DI
Treatment group    DX-DI DI-DX
Performance characteristics
Export turnover -0.00000340** -0.000000556
(2.33) (1.12)
Export share 1.067*** 0.107
(6.86) (0.42)
Employees (in logs) -0.0751 0.0682
(0.85) (0.71)
Operating turnover (in logs) 0.344*** 0.124
(4.03) (1.32)
Operating turnover growth -0.0205 -0.0683
(0.43) (0.42)
Labour productivity -0.000225* -0.0000137
(1.65) (0.64)
Ownership structure
Corporate shareholder (d) 0.177* -0.249
(1.94) (1.56)
Financial shareholder (d) 0.385*** 0.428***
(2.93) (2.69)
State shareholder (d) 0.259 0.0436
(0.92) (0.12)
Individual shareholder (d) 0.142 0.205
(1.61) (1.52)
Foreign shareholder (d) -0.0129 -0.242
(0.10) (-1.26)
Domestic subsidiaries 0.0193 0.000704
(1.35) (0.05)
General firm characteristics 
Liquidty ratio 0.251 -0.145
(1.38) (0.60)







Notes: Reported are the coefficents fromprobit estimations. The treatment variable takes
the value 1if a switch occurs,0 otherwise.Control dummies are included for the industry
affiliation ofthe companies.(d) fordiscrete change of dummy variable from0 to 1. The z-
statistics are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.17 
 
Table 4: Balancing test for nearest neighbour matching, DX-DI and DX-DX in 2002 
 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control Bias (%) Bias reduction (%) t p > |t|
Export turnover Unmatched 16855 5327 24.7 2.60 0.009
Matched 16855 21315 -9.6 61.3 -0.88 0.379
Export share Unmatched 0.317 0.127 79.8 11.08 0.000
Matched 0.317 0.285 13.5 83.0 1.00 0.317
Employees (in logs) Unmatched 4.38 3.03 93.8 11.67 0.000
Matched 4.38 4.59 -14.5 84.5 -1.23 0.221
Operating turnover (in logs) Unmatched 9.83 8.20 104.1 12.59 0.000
Matched 9.83 10.06 -14.8 85.8 -1.30 0.195
Operating turnover growth Unmatched 0.082 0.137 -1.7 -0.15 0.883
Matched 0.082 0.018 1.9 -16.0 2.14 0.033
Labour productivity Unmatched 343.2 331.7 0.6 0.05 0.959
Matched 343.2 361.6 -0.9 -61.5 -0.32 0.749
Corporate shareholder (d) Unmatched 0.600 0.327 56.9 7.13 0.000
Matched 0.600 0.613 -2.7 95.3 -0.23 0.817
Financial shareholder (d) Unmatched 0.142 0.043 34.5 5.78 0.000
Matched 0.142 0.110 11.3 67.3 0.85 0.393
State shareholder (d) Unmatched 0.026 0.012 10.5 1.59 0.111
Matched 0.026 0.019 4.8 54.5 0.38 0.703
Individual shareholder (d) Unmatched 0.355 0.338 3.6 0.45 0.655
Matched 0.355 0.329 5.4 -49.8 0.48 0.633
Foreign shareholder (d) Unmatched 0.135 0.050 29.7 4.69 0.000
Matched 0.135 0.181 -15.7 47.1 -1.09 0.277
Domestic subsidiaries Unmatched 1.168 0.324 38.1 6.28 0.000
Matched 1.168 1.039 5.8 84.7 0.33 0.739
Liquidty ratio Unmatched 0.236 0.178 23.5 2.67 0.008
Matched 0.236 0.232 1.6 93.1 0.15 0.880
Knowledge capital Unmatched 1.435 2.957 -7.3 -0.65 0.516
Matched 1.435 1.272 0.8 89.3 0.30 0.764
Age Unmatched 29.18 25.41 20.8 2.77 0.006
Matched 29.18 31.52 -12.9 38.1 -1.01 0.316
Propensity score Unmatched 0.104 0.028 115.5 18.91 0.000
Matched 0.104 0.104 0.2 99.8 0.01 0.989
Notes: Reported are the mean values of the treated (DX-DI) and control (DX-DX) group, before and after the matching
for the year 2002 (pre-change year, t-1). The t-test are used to test for the equality of those means. The corresponding
results for the industry variables are not reported but they are available on request.18 
 
Table 5: Balancing test for nearest neighbour matching, DI-DX and DI-DI in 2002 
 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control Bias (%) Bias reduction (%) t p > |t|
Export turnover Unmatched 44122 42791 0.9 0.09 0.932
Matched 45768 55365 -6.2 -621.1 -0.37 0.710
Export share Unmatched 0.294 0.308 -5.3 -0.54 0.592
Matched 0.303 0.259 16.3 -207.8 1.39 0.165
Employees (in logs) Unmatched 5.07 4.80 17.5 1.82 0.069
Matched 5.06 5.03 2.0 88.3 0.16 0.876
Operating turnover (in logs) Unmatched 10.58 10.31 16.6 1.72 0.087
Matched 10.56 10.40 9.5 43.1 0.71 0.481
Operating turnover growth Unmatched 0.036 0.052 -4.0 -0.35 0.726
Matched 0.035 -0.015 12.7 -218.7 1.37 0.171
Labour productivity Unmatched 663.9 819.2 -4.1 -0.37 0.714
Matched 635.1 348.3 7.5 -84.6 1.18 0.240
Corporate shareholder (d) Unmatched 0.726 0.771 -10.3 -1.07 0.285
Matched 0.742 0.695 10.8 -5.1 0.83 0.406
Financial shareholder (d) Unmatched 0.244 0.133 28.8 3.17 0.002
Matched 0.211 0.203 2.0 93.0 0.15 0.878
State shareholder (d) Unmatched 0.030 0.027 1.4 0.14 0.888
Matched 0.031 0.016 9.4 -591.0 0.82 0.411
Individual shareholder (d) Unmatched 0.356 0.318 8.0 0.82 0.411
Matched 0.359 0.469 -23.1 -190.4 -1.78 0.076
Foreign shareholder (d) Unmatched 0.096 0.147 -15.6 -1.53 0.127
Matched 0.102 0.055 14.3 8.2 1.40 0.164
Domestic subsidiaries Unmatched 2.47 1.92 12.2 1.18 0.240
Matched 2.38 3.09 -15.5 -27.3 -1.04 0.297
Liquidty ratio Unmatched 0.149 0.181 -11.2 -1.21 0.226
Matched 0.156 0.176 -7.3 35.1 -0.62 0.535
Knowledge capital Unmatched 3.61 2.40 5.6 0.66 0.511
Matched 3.59 1.78 8.4 -50.3 0.75 0.452
Age Unmatched 35.18 34.61 2.4 0.24 0.808
Matched 35.41 34.52 3.8 -59.0 0.30 0.763
Propensity score Unmatched 0.283 0.204 65.5 7.23 0.000
Matched 0.265 0.265 0.1 99.8 0.01 0.993
Notes: Reported are the mean values of the treated (DI-DX) and control (DI-DI) group, before and after the matching for 
the year 2002 (pre-change year, t-1). The t-test are used to test for the equality of those means. The corresponding
results for the industry variables are not reported but they are available on request.19 
 
Figure 1 Propensity score densities for DX-DI and DX-DX (in 2002) 
 
 
Figure 2: Propensity score densities for DI-DX and DI-DI (in 2002) 
 
 
The obtained propensity scores from the probit estimations are used to match each changing 
firm (treated) to a non-changing firm (control) with the nearest propensity score. Table 4 and 
Table 5 show the balancing test for the treated and control groups before and after the 20 
 
matching for the year 2002 (t-1).
9 Reported are the means of variables used in the probit 
estimation which then allows to compare the ex-ante mean difference between changers and 
non-changers in the unmatched and matched samples. Before the matching firms differ 
substantially with respect to the means of the reported covariates. Exporters that become new 
MNEs (DX-DI, Table 4) are on average larger (in terms of operating turnover, number of 
employees and number of domestics subsidiaries), older and more productive. Moreover, their 
share of exports, corporate, financial and foreign investors is about twice as large as for 
continuous exporters. In contrast, knowledge capital is higher for continuous exporters in the 
unmatched samples.  
Before the matching, MNEs that become pure exporters (DI-DX, Table 5) are fairly similar to 
continuous MNEs in terms of size, age, export extensity and intensity. However, labour 
productivity and the share of foreign shareholders are on average lower for the former 
whereas knowledge capital and the share of financial shareholders are higher.  
Overall, the large ex-ante difference which exists between treated and control firms in the 
unmatched samples can be alleviated through the matching process. Large bias reductions are 
achieved (column 6) and the t-tests (columns 7 and 8) show that for all variables (with the 
exception of operating turnover growth in Table 4 and individual ownership in Table 5) no 
significant differences in the mean values are discernible between changers and non-changers. 
Most important, the propensity is not significantly different in both groups after the matching.  
The fit of the match can further be evaluated by examining the underlying density 
distributions of the propensity score for both groups. Whereas the density distribution for the 
upward changing sample is nearly identical after the matching (Figure 1), the overlap of the 
entire distributions in the downward case is large but not identical (Figure 2). 
 
5.2   Difference-in-difference estimation  
The results from the difference-in-difference estimation for the various performance 
indicators and internationalization modes are presented in Tables 6 and 7. The three year 
samples for each internationalization mode are pooled.
10 Consequently, the short-term 
analysis in t+1 is based on a larger sample of firms than the long-term analysis for t+5 and 
                                                 
9 The balancing tests for 2000 and 2005 yield similar results and are available on request. 
10 The pooling should increase the robustness of the results. Results for the ex-post performance analysis for each 
internationalization mode and year sample are available on request. In the previous step for the probit 
estimations, the samples have not been pooled to be better account for any macroeconomic year fixed effects. In 
principle, we refrain from matching a firm in 2000 with a firm in 2005.  21 
 
t+6  (see the panel structure in Table 1). Furthermore, the results from the difference-in-
difference estimations are presented for firms which might not have a complete outcome 
record in all post-change periods (e.g. operating revenue is missing in one period).
11  
 
Investing abroad  
With exception of export share all results from the difference-in-difference estimations 
measure differences between annual average growth rates in the outcome variable for treated 
and non-treated firms. Table 6 shows the results for the home performance of exporters that 
have become engaged in FDI (DX-DI). Our main variables of interest are at first export 
turnover and export to total operating turnover (export share). New MNEs do not display a 
significant increase in the absolute export turnover compared to exporters that, at the same 
time, did not become engaged in FDI.  
However, new MNEs display a significantly higher growth in the export share in all post-
change periods. In the first year after switching the difference in the export share is around 
4.00 percentage points between treated and non-treated firms. This difference increases to 
9.18 percentage points six years after switching. Again, the change is remarkably high 
because treated firms display an initial ratio of exports to total sales of around 31.7 per cent 
(see Table 4). These findings suggest that exporting and FDI are rather complements than 
substitutes in international trade. This conclusion is in line with the theoretical predictions and 
empirical findings of other scholars (e.g. Head and Ries 2004, Krautheim 2009). 
The difference-in-difference measures show positive signs in for employment and turnover 
growth in the short and medium term. The turnover growth is always about one percentage 
point higher than the employment growth. One reason for this rise in turnover might be that 
foreign investments based on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) increase the 
opportunity to exploit economies of scale within the enlarged corporate network (e.g. Röller 
et al. 2001). Nevertheless, neither labour productivity nor TFP are significant at the 
conventional levels. The latter finding suggests that productivity gains at home are rather 
limited. As a robust check, we restricted our analysis to firms within each cohort (see Table 1) 




                                                 
11 Robustness checks are carried out for firms with a complete outcome record in all post-change periods. 
12 Results are available on request. 22 
 
Table 6: The effect of becoming engaged in FDI on firm’s home performance (DX-DI) 
 
Outcome variable xt+k - xt-1 Treated firms Diff-in-diff t
Export turnover t+1 829 0.0420 0.893
t+2 641 0.0608 1.291
t+3 626 0.0375 1.021
t+4 628 0.0355 1.134
t+5 468 0.0452 1.100
t+6 483 0.0125 0.389
Export share t+1 882 0.0400 *** 2.754
t+2 688 0.0596 *** 2.829
t+3 680 0.0615 *** 2.656
t+4 684 0.0711 *** 2.882
t+5 523 0.0824 ** 2.467
t+6 537 0.0918 *** 2.657
Employment t+1 824 0.0251 1.574
t+2 619 0.0409 ** 2.571
t+3 592 0.0388 ** 2.116
t+4 617 0.0236 * 1.748
t+5 440 -0.0051 0.405
t+6 516 -0.0006 0.050
Operating turnover t+1 882 0.0377 ** 2.463
t+2 688 0.0530 *** 2.804
t+3 680 0.0431 ** 2.205
t+4 684 0.0414 ** 2.064
t+5 523 0.0335 1.622
t+6 537 0.0226 1.275
Labour productivity t+1 824 0.0124 0.771
t+2 619 0.0112 0.862
t+3 592 0.0042 0.371
t+4 617 0.0056 0.494
t+5 440 0.0169 1.415
t+6 516 0.0150 1.159
TFP t+1 789 0.0054 0.361
t+2 572 -0.0143 0.782
t+3 587 -0.0051 0.331
t+4 570 -0.0077 0.713
t+5 404 0.0055 0.557
t+6 470 0.0059 0.564
Notes: Reported are the results for the difference-in-difference estimations
with xt+k -x t-1, where t = change period and k takes the values 1 to 6. "Full
restriction" implies that variable information must be available in all post-
change periods. "No restriction" imposes no restriction on the information
availability. The t values are reported and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.23 
 
Table 7: The effect of foreign divestment on firm’s home performance (DI-DX) 
 
Outcome variable xt+k - xt-1 Treated firms  Diff-in-diff t
Export turnover t+1 242 -0.0156 0.190
t+2 156 -0.0580 0.877
t+3 150 -0.0584 1.036
t+4 154 -0.0419 0.802
t+5 43 -0.0782 0.526
t+6 45 -0.0794 0.562
Export share t+1 255 0.0588 ** 2.225
t+2 185 0.0077 0.202
t+3 183 0.0186 0.469
t+4 187 0.0077 0.192
t+5 58 0.0351 0.261
t+6 60 0.0442 0.292
Employment t+1 245 0.0282 0.925
t+2 172 0.0225 0.721
t+3 159 0.0246 0.790
t+4 180 0.0205 0.850
t+5 37 0.0330 0.367
t+6 58 0.0003 0.006
Operating turnover t+1 255 0.0018 0.068
t+2 185 -0.0009 0.029
t+3 183 0.0130 0.460
t+4 187 -0.0014 0.052
t+5 59 -0.0104 0.169
t+6 60 -0.0099 0.199
Labour productivity t+1 244 -0.0307 1.061
t+2 172 -0.0170 0.500
t+3 159 -0.0063 0.263
t+4 179 -0.0245 1.212
t+5 37 -0.0030 0.035
t+6 58 -0.0065 0.135
TFP t+1 222 -0.0137 0.559
t+2 139 -0.0047 0.222
t+3 140 -0.0013 0.076
t+4 147 -0.0128 0.942
t+5 29 0.0228 0.251
t+6 48 0.0046 0.096
Notes: Reported are the results for the difference-in-difference estimations
with xt+k -x t-1, where t = change period and k takes the values 1to 6."Full
restriction" implies that variable information must be available in all post-
change periods. "No restriction" imposes no restriction on the information
availability. The t values are reported and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.24 
 
Foreign divestitures 
Table 7 reports the difference-in-difference measures for the situation that MNEs divest all 
foreign operations to become pure exporters (DI-DX). We find that a downward change from 
FDI to exporting results in a significant short-term increase in the export share for treated 
firms. In the medium- and long-run, however, these switching firms do not display higher 
export intensity than MNEs that did not change. The short-term effect is in line with the 
prediction that divesting from abroad implies a concentration of production at home and 
serving foreign markets by exporting. Losing the affiliate in foreign markets might reduce in 
the long-term, however, the chance to export home-centred products to foreign markets at 
lower costs (see Krautheim 2009 for detail).  
Export turnover, operating revenue and employment are not significantly affected by 
changing the internationalization mode. Moreover, both productivity measures exhibit 
negative coefficient which are, however, not significant at the conventional levels. Thus, a 
retreat from international markets is neither linked to performance losses nor gains at home. 
After divestitures, companies can (re)focus on their domestic activities and streamline 
processes to the demand of their home market. Robustness checks for firms with a complete 
post-change record confirm these results.  
Overall, cross-border divestitures do not significantly affect the growth path of divesting 
firms. This finding contradicts findings that divestitures are positively evaluated by financial 
markets due to positive cumulative abnormal returns after the announcement of a divestiture 
(see e.g., Mathur et al. 2006).  
 
Industry differences 
In a next step, the above analysis is repeated by splitting the sample into high- and low-
technology firms to better account for heterogeneity in the underlying technology profile of 
enterprises. While we do not have data about expenditures for research and development we 
apply the NIW/ISI list of high-tech industries in manufacturing (Legler and Frietsch 2007) 
and the list of high-tech service industries suggested by Nerlinger (1998).  
Table 8 reports the findings from the difference-in-difference estimation of exporters that 
become engaged in FDI (DX-DI). Exporters in high-tech industries exhibit a strong growth in 
their export turnover of up to 9.6 percentage points in the short-term compared to non-treated 
high-tech firms, whereas companies in low-tech industries do not achieve any significant 
growth in export share related to non-treated low-tech firms.  25 
 





Outcome variable xt+k - xt-1
Treated firms 
high technology Diff-in-diff t
Treated firms 
low technology Diff-in-diff t
Export turnover t+1 270 0.0964 * 1.700 559 0.0151 0.321
t+2 210 0.0698 1.281 431 0.0564 1.203
t+3 203 0.0637 1.349 423 0.0250 0.717
t+4 210 0.0791 ** 2.043 418 0.0146 0.485
t+5 158 0.0729 1.609 310 0.0323 0.792
t+6 158 0.0525 1.285 325 -0.0066 0.219
Export share t+1 290 0.0502 *** 2.765 592 0.0350 ** 2.522
t+2 223 0.0649 ** 2.364 465 0.0570 *** 2.957
t+3 218 0.0798 *** 2.721 462 0.0528 ** 2.428
t+4 220 0.0973 *** 3.206 464 0.0587 ** 2.501
t+5 169 0.1336 *** 3.318 354 0.0579 * 1.819
t+6 175 0.1165 *** 2.852 362 0.0798 ** 2.409
Employment t+1 269 0.0226 1.232 555 0.0263 1.576
t+2 199 0.0528 ** 2.535 420 0.0353 ** 2.315
t+3 186 0.0442 * 1.658 406 0.0360 ** 2.269
t+4 201 0.0288 ** 1.976 416 0.0211 1.505
t+5 143 -0.0065 0.430 297 -0.0046 0.351
t+6 169 0.0037 0.284 347 -0.0027 0.208
Operating turnover t+1 290 0.0602 *** 2.697 592 0.0267 * 1.830
t+2 223 0.0774 *** 3.094 465 0.0413 ** 2.321
t+3 218 0.0649 ** 2.556 462 0.0329 * 1.786
t+4 220 0.0574 ** 2.105 464 0.0339 * 1.879
t+5 169 0.0486 * 1.947 354 0.0263 1.336
t+6 175 0.0355 1.559 362 0.0165 0.989
Labour productivity t+1 269 0.0468 *** 2.603 555 -0.0044 0.268
t+2 199 0.0299 * 1.854 420 0.0023 0.179
t+3 186 0.0193 1.390 406 -0.0030 0.268
t+4 201 0.0114 1.001 416 0.0027 0.227
t+5 143 0.0253 * 1.928 297 0.0124 1.023
t+6 169 0.0188 1.452 347 0.0131 0.981
TFP t+1 244 0.0332 1.516 545 -0.0077 0.559
t+2 172 0.0130 0.556 400 -0.0264 1.570
t+3 179 0.0169 0.829 408 -0.0152 1.089
t+4 175 0.0117 0.884 395 -0.0167 1.645
t+5 125 0.0261 ** 2.144 279 -0.0044 0.466
t+6 142 0.0169 * 1.754 328 0.0009 0.085
Notes:Reported are the results forthe difference-in-difference estimations with x t+k -x t-1,where t =change period and k takes the
values 1 to 6. The t values are reported and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.26 
 
Table 9: Performance of high- and low technology firms (DI-DX) 
 
 
Outcome variable xt+k - xt-1
Treated firms 
high technology Diff-in-diff t
Treated firms 
low technology Diff-in-diff t
Export turnover t+1 91 0.0305 0.412 151 -0.0439 0.461
t+2 57 0.0151 0.181 99 -0.0997 1.430
t+3 51 0.0380 0.494 99 -0.1084 * 1.915
t+4 55 0.0442 0.641 99 -0.0892 1.629
t+5 17 0.0509 0.281 26 -0.1499 0.978
t+6 14 0.0474 0.186 31 -0.1275 1.067
Export share t+1 92 0.0700 ** 2.176 163 0.0525 * 1.920
t+2 65 -0.0106 0.226 120 0.0176 0.444
t+3 63 0.0294 0.611 120 0.0131 0.316
t+4 67 0.0166 0.329 120 0.0027 0.063
t+5 21 0.1055 0.711 37 -0.0050 0.034
t+6 22 0.0751 0.397 38 0.0263 0.173
Employment t+1 90 0.0142 0.424 155 0.0360 1.007
t+2 60 0.0362 0.878 112 0.0153 0.449
t+3 53 0.0520 1.238 106 0.0106 0.331
t+4 65 0.0364 1.128 115 0.0116 0.455
t+5 13 0.0109 0.089 24 0.0450 0.483
t+6 22 0.0071 0.117 36 -0.0038 0.068
Operating turnover t+1 92 0.0317 1.092 163 -0.0152 0.499
t+2 65 0.0362 1.007 120 -0.0211 0.607
t+3 63 0.0525 1.469 120 -0.0080 0.277
t+4 67 0.0284 0.731 120 -0.0181 0.664
t+5 22 -0.0026 0.030 37 -0.0150 0.247
t+6 22 0.0088 0.116 38 -0.0207 0.451
Labour productivity t+1 89 0.0037 0.121 155 -0.0506 1.518
t+2 60 0.0078 0.214 112 -0.0301 0.808
t+3 53 0.0028 0.088 106 -0.0106 0.431
t+4 65 -0.0221 0.861 114 -0.0261 1.203
t+5 13 0.0606 0.547 24 -0.0375 0.422
t+6 22 0.0017 0.029 36 -0.0112 0.217
TFP t+1 79 -0.0114 0.298 143 -0.0147 0.680
t+2 42 0.0186 0.675 97 -0.0154 0.736
t+3 45 0.0119 0.545 95 -0.0075 0.446
t+4 48 -0.0020 0.089 99 -0.0177 1.444
t+5 10 0.0162 0.125 19 0.0267 0.321
t+6 18 0.0152 0.272 30 -0.0017 0.034
Notes: Reported are the results for the difference-in-difference estimations with xt+k - xt-1, where t = change period and k takes 
the values 1 to 6. The t values are reported and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.27 
 
Moreover, firms in high-tech industries display a significant growth in the export share of 5.0 
up to 13.4 percentage points in the post-switching periods compared to exporters that did not 
become engaged in FDI. In contrast, firms in low-tech industries attain an export share growth 
of 3.5 to 8.0 percentage points only. These findings might indicate that home centralization of 
certain products is stronger for high-technology firms.  
Similarly, the employment and operating turnover growth is usually two to three percentage 
points higher for high-technology firms compared to the results for the low-technology firms. 
Finally, firms in high-tech industries experience a significant productivity growth in the short- 
and long-term, whereas low-tech firms exhibit no significant growth in this outcome variable. 
In sum, high-technology exporters that become engaged in FDI clearly outperform non-
switching high-technology exporters as well as switching low-technology exporters. 
Results for the home performance of MNEs that become pure exporters (DI-DX) are 
displayed in Table 9. Both, high-technology and low-technology firms that switch downwards 
experience a short-term growth in their export intensity of 7.0 and 5.3 percentage points, 
respectively, compared to non-switching firms. Downward switching MNEs in low-
technology industries experience a negative turnover and productivity growth in all post-
change periods, which, however, is insignificant.  
The overall results for divesting firms show no substantial performance differences with 
respect to technology differences, though a larger firm sample might be helpful to check for 
the robustness of those findings. Furthermore, analyzing the reasons for divestiture as well as 
the transaction form (sell-off, shutting down, spin-off) might be essential to further enhance 
the knowledge concerning the link between investment, divestiture and subsequent corporate 
performance. 
 
6.  Conclusion  
This paper empirically analyses for French firms the effects on home enterprises’ 
performance when investing or divesting abroad. A propensity score matching combined with 
a difference-in-difference estimator is applied to derive empirical findings.  
We find a substantial rise in the export share for exporters becoming engaged in outward FDI 
indicating that FDI and exports are rather complements than substitutes. This 
complementarity might explain why the annual employment and turnover growth exceeds 2 to 
5 percentage points in the post-change periods for new MNEs. The positive association 28 
 
between FDI and exporting is very strong for switching firms in high-tech industries 
compared to non-switching firms and moderate for switching firms in low-tech industries.  
Not many studies have analysed whether and how divesting from abroad affects home 
enterprise’ performance, although divestitures, like investments, are a central part in global 
business dynamics. In the short-term former FDI activities are substituted by exports. 
However, contrary to positive responses of financial markets with respect to divestitures 
announcements, the impact of real economic effects in terms of turnover, employment and 
productivity are negligible in post-divestiture periods. Based on our findings, one can 
conclude that the home country does not need not to fear negative repercussion from firms 
coming back home, but neither can it gain from foreign divestiture.  
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